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How to Be a Reliabilist
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified
belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant
versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justi-
fied belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of com-
petent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent
abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes
abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed
takes a leaf from process reliabilism. Finally, I will provide reason to be-
lieve that the view compares favourably with both extant versions of virtue
reliabilism and process reliabilism. In particular, I will show that in taking
abilities to essentially involve reliable processes, the view has an edge over
extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Moreover, I will argue that the proposed
view can either solve or defuse a number of classical problems of process re-
liabilism, including the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant
cases and the generality problem.
Introduction
One of the most prominent accounts of justified belief in recent literature is re-
liabilism. Among reliabilist accounts, at least two species can be distinguished.
The most widely discussed reliabilist theory is process reliabilism, which was first
stated in Alvin Goldman’s seminal 1979 paper. According to process reliabilism
what matters to whether one believes justifiably is, roughly, whether one’s belief
was produced by a process that is reliable in the sense that it tends to produce be-
liefs with a favourable truth to falsity ratio.1 An alternative to process reliabilism is
virtue reliabilism, which first surfaced in the contemporary debate in [Sosa 1980].
It agrees with process reliabilism that there is a reliability condition on justified
belief. However, what matters for justified belief is not so much whether a belief
was produced by a reliable process, but, again roughly, whether it was produced
∗KU Leuven, Email: christoph.kelp@hiw.kuleuven.be.
1 Process reliabilism has been defended extensively by Alvin Goldman [e.g. 1979, 1986, 2012].
Other champions include Hilary Kornblith [e.g. 2002, 2004, 2009], Jack Lyons [e.g. 2009] and
Sandy Goldberg [e.g. 2010].
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by a reliable agent ability, where the notion of ability is analysed in terms of an
agent disposition.2
For the purposes of this paper I will assume without further argument that some
reliabilist account of justified belief is correct. My central aim will be to develop
a novel reliabilist account of justified belief, which improves on extant versions of
both process and virtue reliabilism by incorporating insights from both sides. It
sides with extant versions of virtue reliabilism in that it takes justified belief to re-
quire reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism,
it does not analyse agent abilities in terms of agent dispositions. Rather, it takes
abilities to essentially involve processes. In this way, the account also incorporates
a process reliabilist element.3
In order to achieve this, I will first outline process reliabilism as well as a num-
ber of prominent problems the view encounters (section 1). In section 2, I will
present virtue reliabilism and highlight some advantages the view has vis-à-vis
process reliabilism. However, I will also develop a problem for virtue reliabilism
and argue that this problem can be solved by introducing processes into the ac-
count of abilities. Section 3 develops a novel general account of (a certain kind
of) competent performance. More specifically, I analyse competent performances
in terms of abilities and their exercises, where abilities, in turn, are taken to essen-
tially involve reliable processes of a sort. In section 4, I apply the general account
of competent performance to the case of belief and derive a novel reliabilist ac-
count of justified belief. Since competent performances in general involve reliable
processes, so do justified beliefs according to the proposed account. Given that the
resulting reliabilist account employs process reliabilist ideas, I will ask whether
the view falls prey to the classical problems for process reliabilism. I will argue
the answer to this question is no. Finally, section 5 considers some objections to
this view and offers responses.
1 Process Reliabilism
1.1 The View
Process reliabilism offers an account of justified belief. The core idea of process
reliabilism is that justified beliefs are beliefs that are produced by processes that
tend4 to produce beliefs with a favourable truth to falsity ratio. In other words,
2 Sosa has published extensively on the virtue reliabilism [see e.g. Sosa 1991, 2011, 2015 as
well as his contribution to BonJour & Sosa 2003] and continues to be its most prominent advo-
cate. Other prominent champions of virtue reliabilism include John Greco [e.g. 1999, 2000, 2010]
and Linda Zagzebski [e.g. 1996]. I have also defended a version of the view e.g. in [Kelp 2016,
Forthcoming].
3 Note that I do not aim to offer an account that effects a happy marriage between virtue and
process reliabilism where both are taken to be equal partners. Rather, I take the virtue reliablist
component to do the bulk of the work. Accordingly, the view may be thought of as a version of
virtue reliabilism with a process reliabilist twist.
4 Goldman deliberately leaves open whether to give ‘tendency’ an frequentist or a propensity
interpretation. His reason for this is that our ordinary conception of justification is vague on this
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justified beliefs are beliefs produced by processes that reliably produce true beliefs
(henceforth also ‘reliable processes’).
With the core idea in play, let’s turn to some important qualifications. Note that
not all belief-forming processes are created equal. Some belief-forming processes,
most notably perception, do not have beliefs among their inputs. For instance, my
perceptual belief that I am sitting at my desk has no beliefs among its inputs. It is
not as if I believe that I am sitting at my desk based on a prior belief that I have an
experience as of sitting at my desk. Rather, the only inputs to the process are non-
doxastic. They may comprise an experience as of a desk, certain retinal stimuli
or perhaps something entirely different. Other belief-forming processes do have
beliefs among their inputs. The most prominent example here is inference. When
you form a belief that q by inference from a belief that p and a belief that if p, then
q, the inferential process that outputs your belief that q has your belief that p and
your belief that if p then q among its inputs. Following Goldman, I will call the
former kinds of process ‘belief-independent’ and the latter ‘belief-dependent’.
While it makes sense to require belief-independent processes to be reliable in
the sense that in order to deliver justification they must produce beliefs with a
favourable truth to falsity ratio, the same does not hold for belief-dependent pro-
cesses. To see this notice that belief-dependent processes need not be expected
to produce beliefs with a favourable truth to falsity ratio when the input beliefs
happen to be false. Moreover, they need not be expected to ensure that the in-
put beliefs be true. We will do well, then, to weaken the reliability condition on
belief-dependent processes. Rather than requiring that they produce beliefs with
a favourable truth to falsity ratio unconditionally, these processes need only be
conditionally reliable in the sense that they must produce belief with a favourable
truth to falsity ratio given that the input beliefs are true.5
Finally since conditionally reliable processes can only transmit justification but
front and that, as a result, its appropriate to leave the theory vague also [Goldman 1979: 11]. For
the purposes of this paper, I will follow Goldman on this front. For the record, I think there is
reason to prefer something along the lines of a propensity interpretation of ‘tendency’ over the
frequentist alternative.
5 It may be worth noting that the usefulness of the distinction between belief-dependent and
belief-independent processes does not go undisputed. For instance, [Lyons 2009] argues that the
key distinction for process reliabilists is the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs. While
it might be thought that the distinction between belief-dependent and belief-independent processes
unpacks just this distinction in process reliabilist terms, there is excellent reason to think that this
cannot be the case after all. For instance, the resulting account will categorise introspective beliefs
about other beliefs as non-basic, whereas they should come out as basic. Another way in which
the distinction may be problematic is if the processes that produce perceptual beliefs turn out to
have perceptual experiences with propositional contents as input. In this case, an argument parallel
to the above argument should provide reason to think that the reliability condition for perceptual
processes should be weakened also. Since perceptual experiences are not beliefs, Goldman’s dis-
tinction is problematic on yet another count. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this
out.) While these are important problems for process reliabilism, I will not take issue with them
within the confines of this paper. Rather, I will rest content with simply following Goldman’s
exposition here.
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not generate it, belief-dependent processes will produce justified beliefs only if the
input beliefs are themselves justified. This gives us the process reliabilist account
of prima facie justified belief in Goldman’s classic formulation:
Process Reliabilist Justification (PRJ). S’s belief that p at t is prima facie justified
if and only if, at t, (i) it “results (‘immediately’) from a belief-independent
process that is (unconditionally) reliable” or (ii) it “results (‘immediately’)
from a belief-dependent process that is (at least) conditionally reliable, and
. . . the beliefs (if any) on which this process operates in producing S’s belief
that p at t are themselves justified.” [Goldman 1979: 13-14]
Even this cannot be the whole story. After all, compatibly with a given belief’s
being formed reliably, the justification of the belief can be defeated. Goldman
proposes a process reliabilist-friendly account of defeat along the following lines:
Process Reliabilist Defeat (PRD). S’s belief in p at t is defeated if and only if
“there is an alternative reliable or conditionally reliable process available to
S which, had it been used by S in addition to the process actually used, would
have resulted in S’s not believing p at t.”6 [Goldman 1979: 20]
Whether a belief is ultima facie justified depends on whether it is prima facie
justified and not defeated in the sense specified in PRD.
Goldman thus offers an account of justified belief covering basic and non-
basic justification as well as prima facie and ultima facie justification. I’d like
to emphasise that, for the purposes of this paper, I will restrict my discussion to
prima facie and basic justification. That is to say, I will bracket the phenomena of
beliefs formed by belief-dependent processes and defeat. In addition, I would like
to focus on justification of first-order beliefs only. Accordingly, I will henceforth
take ‘justified belief’ to mean ‘prima facie basic justified first-order belief’, and I
will work with the following process reliabilist account of justification:
Process Reliabilism (PR). S’s belief that p at t is justified if and only if, at t, it
results (‘immediately’) from a belief-independent process that is (uncondi-
tionally) reliable.
With PR thus in play, let’s look at some of the problems the view is said to
encounter.
6 There are various problems with PRD. For instance, process reliabilists will have provide
an account of what it takes for an alternative process to be available in the relevant sense. And
not every interpretation of ‘available’ will work for process reliabilists. (Thanks to an anonymous
referee for pointing this out. For one interpretation of ‘available’ that will spell trouble for process
reliabilism see [Kvanvig 2007]; see [Beddor 2015] for further critical discussion of PRD.) While
these are also significant issues for process reliabilism, I will again not stop to discuss them here.
Rather, I will again rest content with simply following Goldman’s exposition of these issues.
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1.2 Problems
PROBLEM 1: THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM
Consider cases of radical deception. Let’s suppose, for instance, that you have
become the victim of a mad scientist who has turned you into a brain in a vat
(henceforth just ‘BIV’) that is being fed deceptive experiences as if everything
were normal. It would seem that, in this case, the beliefs you form based on
your experiences continue to be justified. For instance, when you appear to be
waking up in your bed in the morning, and appear to see that your alarm clock
reads 7:45, your corresponding beliefs that you are lying in your bed and that it is
7:45 are justified. Or, at any rate, they are no less justified than they were before
you were turned into a BIV. The problem for PR is that, since you are subject to
radical deception, the processes that produce your beliefs are highly unreliable.
You are a disembodied BIV. You are not lying and surely not in your bed. Your
beliefs about the time (let’s suppose) are wildly mistaken also. As a result, the
processes that produce the corresponding beliefs tend to produce beliefs with a
highly unfavourable truth to falsity ratio. PR predicts, mistakenly, that the beliefs
you form are not justified here.7
PROBLEM 2: CLAIRVOYANCE CASES
PR meets with a similar fate when it comes to cases like the following. Suppose,
as a result of exposure to radiation, you start forming beliefs via a ‘clairvoyance’
belief forming process that reliably produces true beliefs about distant events. You
do not know that you form beliefs in this way. In fact, you have no evidence that
there exists a process of this kind or that it should be so much as possible for it to
exist. On the other hand, you also do not have evidence that such a process does
not exist/is not possible. From your point of view, you spontaneously form beliefs
about distant events. Just now, whilst being on vacation in a faraway country, the
clairvoyance process has produced a belief that your house is on fire. This belief
is not justified. At the same time, the process that produced your belief is highly
7 This problem, which is also known as the new evil demon problem, was first stated in [Lehrer
& Cohen 1983] and [Cohen 1984] as a problem for reliabilist accounts of justified belief. [Wedg-
wood 2002] argues that it generalises to all externalist accounts of justified belief.
But couldn’t PR solve the new evil demon problem by taking the belief-forming processes to
start at the periphery of the brain? After all, even though you will be forming mostly false beliefs
when you become the unlucky victim of a mad scientist, the vast majority of people won’t. Since
processes that start at the periphery of the brain will be shared between victims and non-victims,
the processes that produce beliefs even in victims continue to be reliable. Note, however, that it
is a contingent matter of fact that the vast majority of people who use the same processes form
true beliefs reliably. It might be otherwise. Nearly everyone may be in your predicament. As a
result, it’s at least possible that your beliefs are formed via unreliable processes. Since PR is a
necessarily true if true at all, this will be enough for those who want to charge PR with new evil
demon problem. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
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reliable and so PR predicts, again mistakenly, that your belief is justified.8,9
PROBLEM 3: THE GENERALITY PROBLEM
The core idea of PR is that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a
reliable process. To be more precise, the core idea here is that a belief is justified
if and only if it is produced by a token of a reliable process type. Individual beliefs
are produced by token processes. Token processes are particulars, which, among
other things, are not repeatable. As a result, it’s not clear that the notion of reliabil-
ity even applies to token processes which is why champions of PR typically take
justified belief to require production via a reliable process type.10
To see the difficulty for PR, notice that every token process instantiates in-
definitely many types. The process that produced my belief that I am sitting at
my desk, for instance, instantiates all of the following types: cognitive process,
belief-forming process, perceptual belief-forming process, visual belief-forming
process, to name but a few. Each process type has a different degree of reliabil-
ity. Of course, unless it is specified which process types exactly are the ones at
issue in PR, PR simply does not make determinate predictions about whether or
not individual beliefs are justified. For instance, before PR can make a determinate
prediction on whether my belief that I am sitting at my desk is justified, we need a
specification of which of the various process types that the token process instanti-
ates is the one at issue in PR. In order to work as an account of justified belief at
all, PR must be supplemented with an account that specifies the relevant type of
8 Clairvoyant cases were first adduced by BonJour [1980, 1985] to argue against reliabilist
accounts of justified belief. The related case of Mr. Truetemp is due to Lehrer [1990].
9 It may be worth noting that the new evil demon problem and the problem posed by clair-
voyance cases are especially worrisome for PR in tandem. The new evil demon problem provides
reason to believe that process reliability is not necessary for justified belief, while clairvoyant cases
suggest that it is not sufficient either. If process reliability is neither necessary nor sufficient for
justified belief, it looks as though PR is heading down the wrong epistemological track entirely.
10 [Conee & Feldman 1998: 2]. It may be worth noting that if ‘tendency’ is given a propensity
(rather than frequentist) interpretation, then it will be possible for token processes to be reliable and
unreliable. Note, however, that ‘token versions’ of process reliabilism will face analogues of all the
classical problems for ‘type versions’. To see this, note first that tokens of the wildest belief forming
processes can be reliable, e.g. when one has a helper in the wings who has the power to make the
belief true and is determined (in a modally robust manner) to do so. Suppose, for instance, that I
believe that I will be the world’s richest man based on wishful thinking. My belief is not justified.
However, with a powerful and committed helper in the wings who is ready to (modally robustly)
see to it that I become the world’s richest man, the token process that produced this belief may well
be reliable. On the other hand, even tokens of normally excellent belief forming processes can be
unreliable, e.g. when one is up against an opponent who has the power to make the belief come
out false and is determined (in a modally robust manner) to do so. Suppose, for instance, that I
believe that I am looking at an apple based on normally highly reliable visual perceptual processes.
My belief is justified. However, when up against a powerful and committed opponent, who on
this particular occasion (modally robustly) made me look at an indistinguishable fake, the token
process that produced this belief is unreliable. Finally, as [Comesaña 2006] convincingly argues,
token versions of process reliabilism also encounter a version of the generality problem. So, not
much will be gained by abandoning the classical type version of process reliabilism in any case.
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processes at issue in PR. The problem of specifying the relevant type of process
has become known as the generality problem for PR.11
PROBLEM 4: WORLD-BOUND RELIABILITY
The last problem that I will discuss here is somewhat less prominent. As will be-
come clear in due course, the main reason I introduce it is for dialectical purposes.
To see how it arises notice that, according to PR, process reliability is evaluated
relative to worlds. That is to say, whether a given process type is reliable depends
on the ratio of true to false beliefs it attains at a set of worlds.12
But now consider a process type, T , that takes a certain look of a certain mush-
room as input and outputs a classification of the mushroom as edible. Suppose
T is a highly unreliable process type because, at the set of worlds at which it
is evaluated for reliability, both edible chanterelles and poisonous jack-o’-lantern
mushrooms have this look and throughout this set of worlds nearly everywhere
where there are chanterelles, there are also jack-o’-lanterns. But now suppose,
compatibly with this, that throughout this set of worlds there also exists a remote
island with only a handful inhabitants where there are no jack-o’-lanterns. None
of the inhabitants has ever left the island and they never will. Suppose you are an
inhabitant of this island and form a belief of the mushroom before you that it is
edible via a token of T . Your belief is intuitively justified. Since T is highly un-
reliable due to it’s tendency to produce too many false beliefs at the set of worlds
at which it is evaluated for reliability, however, PR predicts, incorrectly, that your
belief is unjustified.
Consider also the converse situation in which T is highly reliable partly be-
cause, throughout the set of worlds at which it is evaluated for reliability, nearly
only chanterelles have the look in question. Jack-o’-lanterns are nowhere to be
found, with the exception of the remote island you inhabit where they grow as
abundantly as chanterelles. When you form the belief of the mushroom before you
that it is edible via T , your belief is intuitively not justified. Since T is highly reli-
able as it tends to produce true beliefs at the set of worlds at which it is evaluated
for reliability, PR makes yet another incorrect prediction, this time of the presence
of justified belief.13
11 The generality problem was already noted in Goldman’s original 1979 paper. It was developed
into a serious challenge for process reliabilism by Conee and Feldman [1998].
12 This is clear especially from various responses to the new evil demon problem. Goldman
himself considers ‘actual world’ and ‘normal worlds’ versions of PR according to which whether
a belief is justified according to PR depends on whether the relevant process type is reliable at the
actual world or at normal worlds, i.e. “worlds that are consistent with our general beliefs about the
actual world” [Goldman 1986: 107]. The idea is that the new evil demon problem can be avoided
since the relevant process type is reliable at, respectively, the actual world and normal worlds,
at both of which the relevant processes are reliable. Both of these solutions presuppose that the
domain of evaluation are worlds of some denomination.
13 Isn’t this problem structurally analogous to the fake barns problem? And in view of recent
x-phi results, doesn’t this mean that proper epistemological theorising should not rather explain
why intuitions clash here? Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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2 Virtue Reliabilism
2.1 Performance Normativity
Recent statements of virtue reliabilism (VR) start from a general account of perfor-
mance normativity. The core idea is that performances with a goal can be assessed
along the following three dimensions:
Success. Does the performance reach its goal? In other words, is it successful?
Competence. Does the agent perform competently? In other words, is the perfor-
mance produced by an ability to attain the performance’s success?
Aptness. Is the performance successful because competent? In other words, does
the right kind of (explanatory) relation obtain between competence and suc-
cess.
In addition, VR assumes that beliefs are a type of performance with a goal.
More specifically, they are a type of epistemic performance. This means that the
general account of performance normativity can be applied to the special case of
belief, delivering an account of the normativity of belief.
A key question then concerns the nature of the goal of belief understood as
performance. According to standard versions of VR, the goal of belief is truth.14
Given that the goal of belief is truth, we get the following:
First, I am just not sure just what lesson we epistemologists should take the x-phi results to teach
us. The reason for this is that it is not clear to me why we should prioritise laypeople’s judgements
on these cases over expert judgements. On the contrary, I am attracted to side with those who think
that expert judgements should take precedence over laypeople’s [e.g. Williamson 2007, 2011].
Second, while I’d agree that an account of fake barn cases (or a full epistemological theory for
that matter) will do well to explain the clash of intuitions in fake barn cases, it’s not clear to me
that the same goes for an account of knowledge. Rather, it seems to me that what an account of
knowledge needs to do is accommodate the epistemic facts, whatever they may be. For instance,
if agents in fake barn cases lack knowledge, that’s what the account of knowledge should predict.
And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for accounts of justified belief. Since I am interested in
giving an account of justified belief, it’s not clear that proper theorising should really explain the
clash of intuitions here.
Third, even if (i) the cases are structurally analogous, (ii) the x-phi results do suggest a clash
of intuitions about fake barn cases and (iii) as a result we should explain the clash of intuitions
about fake barn cases, it’s not clear this means that the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for this case.
After all, this case is a case about justified belief rather than knowledge. Since an unclear case of
knowledge can still be a clear case of justified belief, we can’t derive conclusions about cases of
justified belief from otherwise structurally analogous cases of knowledge.
But once we consider the question whether the belief in the fake barn case is justified, it seems
clear that the answer is that it is. If so, doesn’t the analogy provide us with reason to think that
the same goes for the above case? No (and this is my last point). It’s not clear that the cases are
analogous. In the fake barn case, the environment in which the agent normally finds himself—his
natural habitat, as it were—does not include any fakes, whereas in the above case it does. That’s a
potentially important structural difference between the two cases.
14 Note that alternatives to standard VR are conceivable and have, as a matter of fact, been
defended in the literature. [Sosa 2015] argues that judgemental belief is of central epistemological
interest and that judgemental belief essentially aims at a form of aptness. If this turns out to
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Successful Belief. A belief is successful if and only if true.
Competent Belief. A belief is competent if and only if it is produced by an exer-
cise of an ability to form true beliefs.
Apt Belief. A belief is apt if and only if it is true because competent.
Crucially, VR identifies knowledge and justified belief with different normative
properties of beliefs as performances. In particular, according to VR:
VR-JB. One justifiably believes that p if and only if one competently believes that
p.
VR-K. One knows that p if and only if one aptly believes that p.
Note that the resulting virtue reliabilism has a number of highly attractive fea-
tures. First, it offers an attractive account of the normativity of belief. Second, it
can offer a theoretical motivation for its accounts of justified belief and knowledge.
After all, the accounts are backed by a general framework for the normativity of
performances. Knowledge and justified belief are instances of familiar normative
categories, to wit, that of apt and competent performance. Third, a number of plau-
sible theses about knowledge and justified belief and their relations drop right out
of the account. Since aptness entails both success and competence, knowledge en-
tails both true belief and justified belief. In contrast, since success and competence
do not entail aptness, justified true belief does not entail knowledge. Moreover,
since success does not entail competence and vice versa, justified belief and true
belief turn out to be logically independent. We can have true but unjustified beliefs
and justified false beliefs.
With these remarks about VR in general in place, I’d like to stress that, in
what follows, I will focus mainly on VR’s account of justified belief as competent
belief. In particular, I will now sketch the virtue reliabilist account of competent
performance from which the key notion of competent belief is derived.
2.2 Competent Performances
THE GENERAL CASE
According to the general account of performance normativity champions of VR
have appealed to, a performance with the aim of attaining a certain success is
competent if and only if it is produced by an ability to attain the relevant success.
This immediately raises the questions as to what abilities are.
be incompatible with the idea that truth is the goal of belief, this means that Sosa departs from
standard VR in this respect. While Sosa may not be a clear case of departure from standard VR,
my own view is. I favour a knowledge first version of virtue reliabilism according to which the goal
is knowledge, which I defend in more detail e.g. in [Kelp 2016, Forthcoming]. For the purposes of
this paper, nothing hinges on whether we opt for a traditional or a knowledge first version of virtue
reliabilism. For that reason, I will follow orthodoxy and work with a traditionalist version of the
view.
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It is widely agreed among champions of VR that abilities are agent disposi-
tions.15 More specifically, they are agent dispositions to produce successful per-
formances. For instance, in order to have the ability to hit the target in target
archery, you must have the disposition to hit the target.
Since abilities are dispositions, a closer look at dispositions may help illumi-
nate the nature of abilities. First, it is plausible that dispositions are relative to
conditions. Take the disposition of water to boil when heated to 100◦C. While wa-
ter has this disposition in certain conditions, i.e. at sea level, it does not have this
disposition in other conditions. For instance, it doesn’t have it at altitudes below
sea level.
Second, dispositions have trigger conditions (T ) and manifestation conditions
(M). In the case of water’s disposition to boil when heated to 100◦C, the trigger
condition is heating to 100◦C and the manifestation condition is boiling.
Third, dispositions correspond to trigger-manifestation conditionals. To say
that something, x, has the disposition to M when T is to say that were T to obtain
in C, x would (likely enough) exhibit M. For instance, to say that water has the
disposition to boil when heated to 100◦C at sea level is to say that were water
heated to 100◦C at sea level, it would (likely enough) boil.
If abilities are dispositions and dispositions have these properties, we may ex-
pect that abilities have these properties as well. And this is exactly what we find.
First, abilities are relative to conditions. Your ability to hit the target in target
archery is relative to conditions. You do not have it when drunk beyond compre-
hension, when strong winds are blowing, etc. Why not? Because you don’t have
the disposition to hit the target in those conditions.
Second, abilities have trigger and manifestation conditions. According to Sosa,
for instance, the trigger conditions for abilities are tryings and the manifestation
conditions successes [Sosa 2015: 96]. In the case of your ability to hit the target,
the trigger conditions is trying to hit the target and the manifestation condition is
hitting the target.
Third, abilities correspond to trigger-manifestation conditionals. Your ability
to hit the target in conditions C (sufficiently sober, not too strong winds etc.) cor-
responds to the conditional: if you were to try to hit the target in C, you would
(likely enough) succeed.16
It may be worth noting that the trigger-manifestation conditionals effectively
impose a reliability condition on abilities. Abilities are, by nature, reliably con-
nected to the relevant successes in the sense that is specified by the trigger-manifest-
ation conditional.
15 See e.g. [Sosa 2010, Greco 2010, Kelp 2011, Pritchard 2012, ?].
16 My presentation of VR’s account of abilities follows [Sosa 2015]. Other champions of VR
have offered slightly different accounts. Greco, for instance, holds that to have an ability to attain
S in certain conditions, C, one must be such that one attains S with a high rate success across
nearby possible worlds at which C obtain [Greco 2010: 77]. However, these differences are of
little consequence for the purposes of this paper.
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THE EPISTEMIC CASE
Let’s apply this account to the case of belief, still understood as a type of per-
formance that aims at truth. The result that we get is that a belief is justified if
and only if it is produced by an exercise of an ability to believe truths, that is, a
disposition on the part of the agent to form true beliefs.
Of course, the dispositions at issue in these abilities also share the proper-
ties of dispositions. That is to say, they are relative to conditions and have the
relevant trigger and manifestation conditions. They also correspond to trigger
manifestation-conditionals and, as a result, feature a reliability condition.
What comes to light is that, according to VR, a reliability condition on justi-
fied belief drops right out of VR’s account of justified belief. As a result, VR can
indeed be seen as a reliabilist account of justified belief. What’s more, note that
VR’s reliability condition on justified belief is but an instance of a general and in-
dependently plausible reliability condition on competent performance. As a result,
VR not only incorporates a core reliabilist idea, it also rationalises it.
THE PROBLEM OF WORLD-BOUND RELIABILITY REVISITED
Note that, with this account of abilities in hand, champions of VR can already
make progress on one of the problems that beset PR, to wit, the problem of world-
bound reliability. To see how VR can solve this problem note that that what matters
to justification according to VR is not the reliability of a process type at a world,
but the reliability of an agent in a particular set of conditions. In the case in which
you are one of a few inhabitants of a remote island on which there are no jack-o’-
lanterns, your belief that the mushroom you are holding is edible will be justified
according to VR. After all, you have a highly reliable disposition to form true
beliefs about edible mushrooms in your conditions. Were you to form a belief that
a mushroom with a certain look is edible in your conditions, your belief would
very likely be true. In the converse case in which jack-o’lanterns exist nowhere
except on the island you inhabit, your belief is unjustified. After all, you do not
have a reliable disposition to produce true beliefs about edible mushrooms in your
conditions. It is not the case that were you to form a belief that a mushroom with
a certain look is edible in your conditions, your belief would very likely be true.
Agent and condition relativity appear to give VR an important advantage here. We
thus have some reason to believe that VR is on the right track.17
17 Consider also the following problem for PR, which an anonymous referee pointed out to me.
Suppose that a small set of powerful agents are seeing to it that, say, the perceptual belief-forming
processes of vast majority of agents are rendered highly unreliable. Since the epistemic oppressors
use the same perceptual belief-forming processes as their victims, this means that they are harming
themselves epistemically: they make it so that their own processes are not reliable and so will not
deliver justified belief and knowledge. However, that seems to be the wrong result. It’s easy to see
that agent and condition relativity will solve this problem as well. In this way, cases like this one
also serve to motivate VR vis-à-vis PR.
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2.3 A Problem: Abilities without Agent Dispositions
While the general account of abilities that virtue reliabilists have offered carries a
fair degree of promise, it also faces an important problem. To see how it arises,
notice that an agent may have different ways of producing performances at his
disposal. To keep things simple, let’s say he has two such ways. For instance,
you may produce shots in target archery with your left hand or with your right
hand. Now, it may well be that a given agent who has two ways of producing
performances of a certain kind at his disposal is disposed to perform successfully
when producing performances of that kind in a certain set of conditions in one
way but not the other. Call the former ‘the good way’ and the latter ‘the bad way’.
You may be disposed to hit the target when shooting with your right hand, but not
when shooting with your left hand. Suppose, finally, that the agent is disposed to
produce performances of said kind in the bad way. His dominant way of producing
performances is the bad way. You took a sacred vow never to shoot with your right
again. However, you still love practising archery. That’s why you have taken to
shooting with your left hand.
In this situation, there is a clear sense in which the agent is not disposed to
perform successfully. According to the standard virtue reliabilist account of abil-
ities, the agent does not have the relevant ability. For instance, you do not have
the ability to hit the target in ARCH. After all, since you sacredly vowed never to
shoot with your right again, if you were to produce a shot, you would produce a
shot with your left. Since there are no conditions relative to which producing a
shot with your left makes success highly likely, the trigger-manifestation condi-
tional that corresponds to the ability to hit the target is false of you no matter what
conditions you may be in. As a result, you do not have the ability to hit the target.
Crucially, this appears to be the wrong result. The mere fact that an agent is
disposed to produce performances of a certain kind in a bad way does not entail
that the agent no longer has the ability to produce successful performances of that
kind, at least not so long as he still has the good way at his disposal. A vow never
to shoot with your right again does not make your ability to hit the target when
shooting with your right disappear. Given that this is so, something is amiss with
the standard virtue reliabilist account of abilities.
I want to suggest that the problem here is that the kind of agent dispositions
that the above general account of abilities countenances are too coarse-grained.
What we need is something more fine-grained. One obvious proposal is to rela-
tivise abilities to ways of producing performances. Once we do so, we can allow
that some ways of producing performances constitute abilities to succeed, whilst
others don’t. As a result, agents may have abilities to attain a certain kind of suc-
cess, whilst not being disposed to exercise them. In fact, they may be disposed to
exercise ways of producing performances that do not qualify as abilities. In that
case, agents will not be disposed to attain the relevant kind of success, even though
they do have the ability to do so. And, of course, this is exactly the situation you
find yourself in after you have taken the vow never to shoot with your right again.
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There is thus reason to relativise abilities to ways of producing performances.
What does that mean for VR’s account of justified belief as competent belief?
Given that competent belief requires the exercise of an ability to form true beliefs
and given that abilities are relative to ways of producing performances, this means
that the abilities required for justified belief are relative to ways of belief formation.
More specifically, to have an epistemic ability of the kind required by justified
belief one must have a way of belief formation that disposes one to form true
beliefs, at least when in suitable conditions.
But now notice that by relativising abilities to ways of producing performances,
VR effectively incorporates a key idea from PR, to wit, that whether a belief is jus-
tified depends on properties of the process that produced it. Of course, this is not
to say that VR collapses into PR. After all, abilities still remain agent and condi-
tion relative as well. In consequence, VR can still secure the advantage vis-à-vis
PR outline above, to wit, that VR avoids the problem of world-bound reliabil-
ity. Moreover, VR still serves to rationalise PR. After all, the relevant reliability
condition on justified belief still drops out of a general account of competent per-
formances. However, once we have a version of VR that adopts a key idea from
PR, the question naturally arises as to whether the view falls prey to the original
problems PR encountered.
3 Competent Performances
In what follows, I will prepare the ground for addressing this question. More
specifically, I will develop a detailed account of competent performance that takes
on board the suggestion that the abilities required for competent performances are
relative to ways of producing performances. I will then apply this general account
to the case of belief and derive a detailed virtue reliabilist account of justified
belief. Finally, I will argue that this account can either solve or defuse the problems
of process reliabilism I introduced in section 1.
3.1 Simple Goal-Directed Practices
Let’s start with a framework for simple goal-directed practices (SGPs). For a prac-
tice to be goal-directed is for it to have a success condition, a condition under
which the practice’s goal is attained.
One very simple kind of goal-directed practice involves two types of particular,
targets and moves, and a designated relation. The success condition of this kind of
practice can be defined as obtaining if and only if a move stands in the designated
relation to the target. In a very simple version of target archery, call it ‘ARCH’, the
target is a disc with a set surface area, moves are shots taken from a set distance,
and the designated relation is the hit relation. A success in ARCH is a shot that
hits the target.
Practitioners of SGPs are move-producers. They may attain success in a given
SGP. They do so if and only if they produce a move that stands in the designated
relation to the target. Practitioners of ARCH are shot-producers. A practitioner of
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ARCH attains a success in ARCH if and only if he produces a shot that hits the
target.
3.2 Abilities
Practitioners of SGPs may have the ability to attain success in a given SGP. You,
the reigning world champion in ARCH, have the ability to hit the target, while I,
a blind man, don’t. Let’s take a closer look at these abilities (henceforth ‘SGP
abilities’).
I agree with the general account of abilities offered by extant versions of VR
that abilities, including SGP abilities, involve dispositions and that, as a result,
they are relative to conditions, have trigger and manifestation conditions, and cor-
respond to trigger-manifestation conditionals.
Crucially, I would like to suggest that SGP abilities involve ways of move pro-
duction. Your ability to hit the target involves a way of shooting. As I already
indicated, more than one way of move production may be available to any one
agent. For instance, you may shoot with your right hand or with your left hand.
Of course, not all ways of move production will qualify as SGP abilities. While
you may have the ability to hit the target in ARCH when shooting with your right
hand, you may not have this ability when shooting with your left.
Since SGP abilities are relative to ways of move production, so are the disposi-
tions at issue in them. And, of course, the same applies to the conditions to which
the dispositions are relative. Accordingly, my suggestion is that a practitioner’s
way of move production, W , qualifies as an ability to attain success in a given
SGP, S, relative to conditions C only if he is disposed to attain S’s success when
using W in C. A given way of shooting you may have will qualify as an ability to
hit the target in ARCH relative to C only if you are disposed to hit the target when
using it in C.
Not every way of move production that disposes one to attain success in a
certain SGP and in certain conditions qualifies as an SGP ability. Suppose I am
an extravagant archer. The only occasions on which I do is when I see a sculpture
by my favourite sculptor. When I do take a shot, I fire it right up in the air. As
it so happens, the only remaining sculpture is located at a shooting range that is
manipulated by an army of clandestine helpers who will see to it that all and only
shots fired right up in the hit the target. Currently I am at the shooting range. I have
noticed the sculpture and have fired arrows straight up into the air. I don’t stay in
order to verify whether my shot actually hit the target. Why should I? There is no
reason for this. However, my shot hits the target. In fact, in this case I am strongly
disposed to hit the target when using my way of shooting in the conditions that
obtain at the range where I take these shots.
Does my way of shooting qualify as an SGP ability, if only relative to those
conditions? I take it to be intuitively clear that the answer to this question is no.
Following Ruth Millikan [2000: 61] I would like to suggest that there is a dis-
tinction between mere dispositions and genuine abilities. Not all dispositions to
attain success qualify as abilities. My disposition to hit the target in the above case
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is a case in point. In consequence, the above picture of SGP abilities as ways of
move production that dispose agents to attain success in certain conditions needs
refinement.
What makes the difference between a genuine ability and a mere disposition?
Taking another leaf from Millikan [2000: ch. 4], I want to say that etiology matters.
Here is Millikan’s proposal:
In general, the conditions under which any ability will manifest itself
are the conditions under which it was historically designed as an abil-
ity. These are conditions in which it was learned, or conditions in
which it was naturally selected for. They are conditions necessary to
completing the mechanisms by which past successes were reached by
the systems or programs responsible for the abilities.
[Millikan 2000: 61]
Here is a natural way of connecting Millikan’s proposal with the picture of SGP
abilities sketched above: to qualify as an SGP ability, a way of move production
must have led one to successful SGP moves in the conditions in which it was
acquired by learning/selected for. If so, since my extravagant way of shooting
arrows up in the air did not lead me to hits in the conditions in which I acquired it,
it does not qualify as an ability.
Unfortunately, however, this way of connecting Millikan’s proposal with the
above picture of SGP abilities encounters a problem. As Millikan also acknowl-
edges, abilities can be acquired by coming to know that a way of producing moves
works, i.e. by coming to know that a way of move production leads to success in
certain conditions [Millikan 2000: 64]. The problem is that when one acquires an
ability in this way, one need not acquire a new way of move production. Rather,
one may simply learn something about an existing way of move production. For
instance, suppose that, in the above case, I am told that, at the relevant shooting
range, I will hit the target if and only if I fire my shots straight up in the air. I
now possesses the ability to hit the target at that shooting range. At the same time,
I have not acquired a new way of move production. Rather, I learned something
about an existing way of move production. The problem is that the way of move
production at issue in my SGP ability never led me to success in the conditions in
which it was acquired by learning.
Here is a way of addressing this problem. In certain cases, agents acquire an
SGP ability by acquiring a new way of move production. In the learning process,
the way of move production gets its shape. The process involves interaction with
the environment during which the way of move production becomes “tuned” [Mil-
likan 2000: 63] to producing successful SGP moves in the conditions that obtain
during the learning process. This is what happened during your training period,
after you had first taken up arching. You practised shooting, adjusting your way
of performing in the light of past successes, tips from your coach and so on. You
underwent a learning process that shaped your way of shooting with the result that
using this way of shooting now disposes you to produce hits in the conditions of
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learning. In this way, the learning process tuned your way of shooting to certain
conditions. As a result, you now have the ability to hit targets in ARCH in those
conditions. Let us say that, in this kind of case, the agent’s way of move production
is ‘metaphysically grounded’.
In contrast, in the case in which I am told that shooting arrows up in the air
will lead to success at the relevant shooting range, I do not acquire a new way of
shooting. Rather, I learn something about an existing way of shooting. That said,
there is a clear sense in which my new knowledge has the same effect here as your
training did. It also tunes my way of move production to producing successful
SGP moves in certain conditions. Crucially, the tuning is of a rather different kind.
In contrast with the metaphysical kind of tuning we found in your case, here the
tuning is epistemic in nature. Accordingly, let us say that, in this kind of case, the
agent’s way of move production is ‘epistemically grounded’.
I want to suggest that in order to qualify as an SGP ability, a way of move pro-
duction must have been tuned by learning or natural selection to some conditions,
thereby grounding the way of move production, be it metaphysically or epistem-
ically. This grounding condition on abilities enables my account to distinguish
between genuine abilities and mere behavioural dispositions.18
I also want to allow that grounded ways of move production can qualify as
SGP abilities for SGPs and conditions to which they have not been tuned. Sup-
pose ARCH is practised only in strongly controlled conditions: indoors, under
very specific artificial lighting conditions, whilst completely sober, etc. (hence-
forth C). Suppose you, the reigning world-champion of ARCH, are trained in C
with the result that your way of shooting is tuned to C. Even so, it is hard to deny
that you may have the ability to hit targets in ARCH in different conditions (e.g.
outdoors, under different lighting conditions, after a beer = C′), at least so long
as your way of shooting continues to dispose you to hit targets in ARCH in those
conditions. Similarly, even if your ability is tuned specifically to ARCH, there can
be no question that you may have the ability to hit targets in certain other SGPs
(e.g. in ARCH’ which is just like ARCH except that the target is a square rather
than a disc), at least so long as your way of shooting continues to dispose you to hit
targets in those SGPs. SGP abilities are thus relative to a range of SGPs and condi-
tions that may differ from the SGP and conditions to which the underlying way of
move production had been tuned. What matters is that the way of move production
continues to dispose the agent to produce successful moves in the relevant SGPs
and/or conditions.
Finally, the SGPs and conditions to which an ability is tuned and the SGPs and
18 It may be worth pointing out that, contrary to what Millikan suggests, these conditions need
not be the condition in which the ability was acquired by learning. To see this, suppose I, the
extravagant archer, am not at the shooting range when I am told that shooting arrows up in the air
will produce successful shots there. I have now acquired the ability to hit the target at that range.
Evidently, in this case, the way of move production does not dispose me to produce successful
moves in the conditions in which it was acquired (i.e. my present conditions). However, my way
of move production disposes me to produce successful moves in the conditions for which it was
acquired (i.e. the relevant shooting range).
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conditions relative to which an agent may have an SGP ability may vary from one
way of move production to another. One of your ways of move production—
shooting with your left hand (W1)—may be tuned to ARCH’, slight intoxica-
tion and natural light, while another—shooting with your right (W2)—is tuned to
ARCH, sobriety and artificial light. It may also be that W2 disposes you to produce
successful moves not only in ARCH but also in ARCH’, not only in artificial light,
but also in natural light but only when entirely sober. In contrast, W1 may work
only for ARCH’ and only in natural light, no matter whether slightly intoxicated or
entirely sober. Further extensions and other combinations are of course possible.
With these points in play, I would like to propose the following general account
of SGP abilities:
SGP Ability, General. One has an ability to attain success in a range, RS, of
SGPs and relative to a range, RC, of conditions if and only if one has a
grounded way of move production, W , such that, for any S ∈ RS, there is
some C ∈ RC such that using W in C disposes one to attain success in S, and
for any C ∈ RC, there is some S ∈ RS such that using W in C disposes one to
attain success in S.
While this offers a fully general account of SGP abilities, it has the disadvan-
tage of being rather complex. At the same time, for present purposes, I rarely
need the account in its full generality. For that reason, I will be working with the
following slightly simplified version of the account:
SGP Ability. One has an ability to attain success in a range, R, of SGPs and
relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has a grounded way of move
production, W , such that, for any S ∈ R, using W in C disposes one to attain
success in S.
3.3 Exercises of Abilities
What does it take to exercise an ability? While virtue reliabilists have developed
detailed accounts of ability, they have rarely stopped to take up this question. I
would like to supply this lack. In particular, I want to suggest that exercises of
SGP abilities are uses of ways of move production involved in SGP abilities. Or,
more precisely,
SGP Exercise. One exercises an ability, A, to attain success for a range, R, of
SGPs and relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has A and produces a
move via the way of move production at issue in A.
It is important to note that placing the agent in conditions relative to which he
does not have an SGP ability can have different effects on an agent’s performances.
Some such conditions will result in preventing an agent from using his way of
move production. For instance, being too drunk, distracted, nervous, shoved while
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releasing the arrow and so on will prevent you from using the way of shooting
that qualifies as an SGP ability relative to some (albeit different) conditions. I
will henceforth refer to conditions that, when not satisfied, prevent the agent from
using his way of move production as conditions of shape (SH). According to SGP
Exercise, then, exercising an SGP ability requires that SH be satisfied.
In contrast, other such conditions do not prevent the agent from using his way
of move production when not satisfied and so allow him to exercise his ability
anyway. Suppose, for instance, that you fire a shot that would have hit the target
had it not been for a jokester who destroys the target when the arrow is about to
hit it. Even though your shot does not hit the target, you do get to produce a move
via the way of shooting that qualifies as an SGP ability relative to some (albeit
different) conditions. I will henceforth refer to conditions that, when not satisfied,
do not prevent the agent from using his way of move production as situational
conditions (SI). According to SGP Exercise exercising an SGP ability does not
require that SI be satisfied.
3.4 Competent Moves
Competent moves in an SGP require the exercise of an SGP ability. When pro-
ducing a shot in ARCH, your shot will be competent only if it is produced by an
ability to hit the target.
However, a competent move requires more than the exercise of an SGP ability.
To see this, let’s return to the case in which you are the reigning world champion
of ARCH. Suppose that you are currently engaging in ARCHX in which the target
changes its position discontinuously, randomly, and rapidly. Let’s assume, as is
plausible anyway, that you do not have the ability to hit the target in ARCHX . You
have no grounded way of shooting that disposes you to produce successful moves
in ARCHX , no matter what conditions we may place you in. Suppose you take a
shot using a grounded way of move production that disposes you to hit the target
in a range R of SGPs and relative to conditions C. Here you exercise your SGP
ability to hit the targets in range R and relative to C. However, that does not make
your shot competent. The ability you exercise is the wrong ability for the SGP
you are engaging in. For a move to be competent, it must be a move in an SGP,
S, that is within the range R for which your way of move production qualifies as
an ability.19 Contrast the situation described above with one in which you engage
in an SGP that, we may assume, is within the range, R, of your SGP ability, but
in which a jokester prevents the shot from being successful. Here you not only
exercise an ability to hit the target, your shot is also competent.
19 An even clearer example may be the following: Suppose you have a grounded way W of
producing layups in basketball that qualifies as an ability to score relative to some C. Currently
you are standing at the midcourt line and have two seconds to score a basket to win the game.
Suppose you produce a shot via W , which, of course, doesn’t even get close to the basket. By
the relevant instance of SGP Exercise, you exercise an ability to score. However, your shot is not
competent. The shot you are taking is not within the range of the ability you exercise.
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There is thus reason to believe that, in order to produce a competent move in a
given SGP, the SGP must be within the range (of SGPs) of the SGP ability exer-
cised. The above considerations thus motivate the following account of competent
moves:
Competent SGP Moves. A move in a given SGP, S, is competent if and only if it
is produced by an exercise of an SGP ability to attain success in a range, R,
of SGPs and relative to conditions, C, such that S ∈ R.
4 A Different Virtue Reliabilism
4.1 The View
With the general account of competent moves in SGPs in play, I will now move
on to the application to the case of belief. To begin with, I would like to suggest
that a relevant fragment of epistemic activity—viz. inquiry into specific whether
questions (henceforth simply ‘inquiry’)—can be understood as an SGP. Or, to be
more precise, it can be understood as a collection of SGPs, one for each question.
More specifically, my suggestion is that the targets of inquiry are true answers.
For instance, the target of an inquiry into whether p is the true member of the
set including the proposition that p and the proposition that not-p. Moves in in-
quiry are beliefs.20 For instance, believing p constitutes a move in an inquiry into
whether p, as does believing not-p. The designated relation in inquiry is the cor-
respondence relation between belief and true answer, where a belief corresponds
to a true answer if and only if its content is identical to the true answer.21 For
instance, a belief that p stands in the designated relation to the target of an inquiry
into whether p if and only if its content, i.e. the proposition that p, is identical to
the true answer, i.e. the true member of the set including proposition that p and
the proposition that not-p. It is easy to see that this gives us the standard virtue
reliabilist account of successful belief according to which a belief is successful if
and only if true.
With the account of successful belief in play, we can now apply the above ac-
counts of SGP abilities, their exercises and competent moves to the case of belief.
This gives us:
Epistemic Ability. One has an ability to form true beliefs about propositions in a
range, R, and relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has a grounded way
of belief formation, W , such that, for any p ∈ R, using W in C disposes one
to form true beliefs that p.
20 A complete account would also countenance suspension of judgement as a type of move. No-
tice, however, that suspension of judgement is a second-order attitude. Given my aim of providing
an account of first-order knowledge and justified belief, the issue of suspension of judgement can
safely be set aside.
21 Note that the view can also easily be given a knowledge first spin. All we need to do is
maintain that the designated relation is the knowledge relation.
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Exercises of Epistemic Abilities. One exercises an ability, A, to form true beliefs
about propositions in range R and relative to conditions C if and only if one
has A and forms a belief via the way of belief formation at issue in A.
Competent Belief. One competently believes that p if and only if one’s belief that
p is formed by an exercise of an ability to form true beliefs about proposi-
tions in range R and relative to conditions C such that p ∈ R.
Recall that, according to extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justified belief,
a belief is justified if and only if competent. I would like to adopt this account
of justified belief as competent belief. In conjunction with Competent Belief, it
entails the following detailed account of justified belief:
VR-JB*. One justifiably believes that p if and only if one’s belief that p is formed
by an exercise of an ability to form true beliefs about propositions in range
R and relative to conditions C such that p ∈ R.
It is important to keep in mind that, while VR-JB* does not explicitly feature
a reliable process condition, it is implicitly present in it. After all, the notions of
ability and their exercise at issue in the right hand side of VR-JB* are analysed
in terms of Exercise of Epistemic Ability and Epistemic Ability. And, according
to Epistemic Ability, epistemic abilities require reliable ways of belief formation.
Since VR-JB* does feature a reliable process condition on justified belief, the
question as to whether VR-JB* succumbs to the classical problems of PR remains.
This question will be taken up in the remainder of this section.
4.2 The Problems for Process Reliabilism Revisited
Recall that PR encounters at least four problems: the new evil demon problem, the
problem of clairvoyant cases, the generality problem and the problem of world-
bound reliability. I have already shown how virtue reliabilism can avoid the prob-
lem of world-bound reliability. Since VR-JB* has little to add on this front, I will
not return to this problem. Rather, I will restrict my focus on the remaining three
problems, starting with the new evil demon problem.
THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM
Recall the new evil demon problem: you are abducted by a mad scientist and
turned into a radically deceived BIV. As a result, many your belief forming pro-
cesses are now highly unreliable. Even so, many of the beliefs you go on to form
are intuitively justified.
In a nutshell, the reason why VR-JB* can solve the new evil demon problem
is (i) that reliability is relative to conditions of grounding and (ii) abilities can be
exercised in unfavourable conditions. Let me explain how this pans out by means
of an example: having recently been envatted, you appear to be taking a reading
from a clock and thereupon come to believe that it is 7:45. Since you are radically
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deceived, your belief is false. In fact, your process of forming beliefs about the
time is now highly unreliable.
According to VR-JB*, what is going on here is that you acquired a way of
forming beliefs about the time in much the same way as other normal (non-deceived)
human beings, i.e. via interaction with the world that shaped your belief forming
process with the result that using it disposes you to form true beliefs about the time
in the conditions of learning. You have grounded way, W , of forming beliefs about
the time that disposes you to form true beliefs about the time when using it in the
conditions of learning, C. By Epistemic Ability, you have the ability to form true
beliefs about the time in C. What happens when you are abducted and envatted
is that you are being moved from C to different conditions C′. These conditions
are of course highly unsuitable for your ability to form true beliefs about the time
in the sense that using W in C′ does not dispose you to form true beliefs about
the time. Crucially, however, having been moved to C′ does not prevent you from
continuing to form beliefs via W . In particular, your belief that it is 7:45 was pro-
duced by using W . By Exercise of Epistemic Ability, you continue to exercise your
ability to form true beliefs about the time. What’s more, you form a belief that it
is 7:45, which is a belief about the time and so falls within the range of the ability
exercised. By VR-JB*, it follows that your belief is justified.22
CLAIRVOYANT CASES
Let’s move on to clairvoyant cases. Recall that, in our toy case, you take to forming
beliefs via a ‘clairvoyance’ belief forming process that produces true beliefs about
distant events with a high degree of reliability. Even so, the beliefs you go on to
form via this clairvoyance process are intuitively not justified.
The key to VR-JB*’s account of clairvoyant cases is the grounding condition
on abilities. In particular, I want to suggest that even though your clairvoyant
process produces true beliefs with a high degree of reliability, it is not grounded.
After all, it is not the case that you underwent a learning process involving inter-
action with the environment during which your clairvoyant process was tuned to
22 What about agents who are born BIVs? Such agents plausibly never have the chance to
acquire the ability to recognise e.g. sunshine. However, since they cannot exercise abilities they do
not have, they are not even in a position to acquire justified beliefs about the presence of sunshine.
It might be objected that, as a result, the present solution to the New Evil Demon problem is
less than fully satisfactory. While I agree that the solution to the New Evil Demon problem is
incomplete, I don’t think it is unsatisfactory. This is because it can be supplemented by a content
externalist solution to the problem of scepticism that arises from cases of agents who are born
BIVs. According to content externalism, agents who are born BIVs may even acquire knowledge
of their environing world. It’s just that their concepts and thoughts have different contents than
ours [see e.g. Putnam 1981]. Notice also that when agents who have not been born BIVs have been
envatted long enough, their thought contents may change. When this happens the character of their
epistemic abilities also changes. They may once again be in a position to know propositions about
their environment. However, just like agents who are born BIVs, the propositions these agents are
now in a position to know are different than the ones inhabitants of normal environments routinely
come to know.
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producing true belief in the conditions that obtained during the learning process.
This means that your clairvoyant process is not metaphysically grounded. More-
over, you also do not have any evidence that your clairvoyant process works and
so it is not epistemically grounded either. Since your clairvoyant process is nei-
ther metaphysically nor epistemically grounded, it does not satisfy the grounding
requirement on abilities. In consequence, it does not qualify as an ability to form
true beliefs about any range of propositions. Since you cannot exercise an ability
you do not have, you do not form a belief via an exercise of an ability to form true
beliefs. By VR-JB*, your belief is not justified.23
THE GENERALITY PROBLEM
Recall that the generality problem for PR arises from the fact that every token
process instantiates indefinitely many types. Many of these process types have
different degrees of reliability, some differ rather dramatically in the degree of
reliability they achieve. Unless it is specified which process types exactly are
the ones at issue in PR, PR simply does not make determinate predictions about
whether or not individual beliefs are justified.
I’d like to flag that I do not mean to offer a head-on solution to the generality
problem here, not in the least because a full solution would certainly outstrip the
confines of this paper. Rather, my strategy will be to try and defuse it.
A large step in the direction of defusing the generality problem has already
been made in [Comesaña 2006] and [Bishop 2010]. Comesaña and Bishop both
argue, convincingly to my mind, that the generality problem is a problem that
affects not just process reliabilism but all theories of justified belief. If so, the
generality problem is a general epistemological problem, rather than a problem
for process reliabilism in particular.
In addition, I will now argue that the generality problem is a problem in the
general theory of performance normativity as it is a problem that arises for compe-
tent performances in general. This is good news especially for VR-JB*. After all,
if the generality problem arises already in the general theory of performance nor-
mativity, it will not be a specifically epistemological problem. As far as VR-JB*
is concerned, then, the generality problem is not only a problem that every theory
of justified belief encounters, but also a problem that finds its proper home in the
general theory of abilities. What’s more, I will provide reason to believe that, as
a problem in the general theory of performance normativity, it is not particularly
worrisome in the first place.
23 It may be worth noting that a knowledge first version of VR will have an even better expla-
nation of clairvoyant cases. Even if one is tempted to say that, in the above case, you do have an
ability to form true beliefs about distant events, it is hard to deny that you don’t have an ability to
know things about distant events. After all, while your way of belief formation does dispose you
to acquire true beliefs here, it does not dispose you to acquire knowledge. Without a disposition to
acquire knowledge, however, you simply cannot have an ability to know. Given that, on a knowl-
edge first version of VR, a belief is justified only if it is produced by an ability to know, clairvoyant
beliefs will not be justified. In this way, adopting a knowledge first version of VR may serve to
strengthen the argument here.
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To begin with, let’s take a look at how the generality problem arises for VR-
JB*’s account of justified belief as competent belief: According to VR-JB* com-
petent beliefs require exercises of abilities to form true beliefs and exercises of
abilities to form true beliefs require uses of ways of belief formation. More specif-
ically, they require uses of tokens of types of ways of belief formation. But, of
course, each such token instantiates indefinitely many types. For instance, my be-
lief that I am sitting at my desk is produced by a token way of belief formation
that instantiates the types cognitive process, visual belief-forming process, etc. To
make determinate predictions about whether a given belief is competent, then, we
need a specification of which of these types is the one at issue in VR-JB*’s account
of competent belief. This is the generality problem as it arises for VR-JB*.
It is now fairly easy to see that the generality problem arises for competent
performances in general. To see this notice that competent SGP moves in general
require exercises of abilities and exercises of abilities require uses of ways of move
production. More specifically, they require uses of tokens of types of ways of move
production. But, of course, each such token instantiates indefinitely many types.
Consider, once more, a case in which you take a shot at a target in ARCH. Your
token way of shooting instantiates all of the following types: shooting, shooting
with a bow, shooting with a bow and arrow, etc. To make determinate predictions
about whether a given shot is competent, then, we need a specification of which of
these types is the one at issue in the general account of competent performance.
In this way, it comes to light that the generality problem arises for competent
performances in general. The generality problem, insofar as it arises for VR-JB*,
is a problem in the general theory of performance normativity, rather than a prob-
lem that affects VR-JB*’s account of justified belief in particular.
Finally, here is why the generality problem as it arises for competent perfor-
mances in general is not particularly worrisome. Notice first that we typically
have no special difficulties in discriminating agents who have certain abilities from
those who do not. For instance, it’s not difficult to distinguish agents who have the
ability to hit the target in ARCH from those who don’t. The same goes, once
again, for the epistemic case. It is not too difficult to find out who has the ability
to recognise apples, BMWs or Picasso’s and who doesn’t. Crucially, we can do
so without being able to offer a precise account of how the process at issue in the
ability is typed. For instance, we can identify that you have the ability to hit the
target in ARCH without being able to pinpoint the exact process type at issue in
your ability. And the same goes for your ability to recognise apples.
As a result, VR-JB* can defuse the generality problem. According to VR-JB*,
justified belief does require reliable belief forming processes of sorts. However,
it does so because justified beliefs are beliefs produced by epistemic abilities and
epistemic abilities involve reliable belief forming processes. Since we can identify
abilities, including epistemic ones, without being able offer a general account of
how the process at issue in the ability is typed, we do not need a solution to the
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generality problem in order to have a workable version of VR-JB*.24
5 Objections and Replies
Before closing, I would like to discuss a couple of issues that VR-JB* might be
thought to encounter.25 The first two effectively take the form of objections to pro-
cess reliabilism, which VR-JB* is then thought to inherit, thanks to its concession
to the former. In contrast, the third is less of an objection than an attempt to help
Sosa to a comeback.
5.1 Modus Ponens Inferences
The first objection concerns cases of immediate inference. To facilitate discussion,
I will work with the following example: you infer q from p and if p, then q by an
application of modus ponens. Now here is the critic’s remark:
Processes are essentially temporally extended, whereas an immediate
inference must be punctiform in time, so this modus ponens inference
is not a process.
I take it that what the critic is driving at here is that PR will run into trouble when
it comes to cases of justified belief based on modus ponens inferences. Accord-
ing to PR, a belief is justified only if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming
process, which is essentially temporally extended. However, your modus ponens
inference is punctiform—that is, not temporally extended—and hence cannot be
a process. Hence, PR cannot allow for the possibility of justified belief based on
modus ponens inference.
To begin with, for the purposes of this paper, I will grant the critic the assump-
tion that your modus ponens inference (henceforth MPI) is indeed punctiform.
Moving on to my response to this objection, I’d first like to focus on a version of
the case in which you instantiate MPI but do not believe q based on MPI. Rather,
you believe q based on wishful thinking. It is widely agreed that, in this version
of the case, your belief in q is not justified. As a result, instantiating MPI is not
sufficient for you to justifiably believe q.
Let’s now ask what is missing. The overwhelmingly plausible answer is that, in
addition to instantiating MPI, you must acquire a belief in q based on MPI, where
this requires that your belief in q is causally related to MPI in the right way. That
24 An anonymous referee suggested that PR also faces a separate problem concerning the indi-
viduation of the length of the processes at issue in PR. While I am not sure whether this problem is
indeed a separate problem, suffice it to say that the above defusing strategy for the generality prob-
lem will also work for the problem of how to individuate the length of the relevant processes. After
all, first, the problem also already arises in the general theory of normativity. And, second, the
problem is no more worrisome than the generality problem. After all, in order to find out who has
relevant abilities, we don’t need to be able to offer a precise account of just how long the process
at issue in the ability is supposed to be.
25 Thanks to a set of anonymous referees for pressing me on these issues.
24
is to say, what’s needed for you to justifiably believe q once you have instantiated
MPI is that your belief in q is the result of a causal process that involves MPI in
the right way.
Given that this is so, the fact that MPI is punctiform does not constitute a
problem for process reliabilism. Here’s why. The critic is of course right in claim-
ing that MPI, since punctiform, cannot be identical to the kinds of causal process
that, according to process reliabilism, are required for acquiring justified beliefs.
Crucially, however, there is independent reason to think that acquisition of a jus-
tified belief in q requires more than just instantiating MPI. More specifically, it is
independently plausible that what’s needed in addition is that your belief in q is
produced by just the kind of causal process that process reliabilists claim is re-
quired for the acquisition of justified beliefs. And even though MPI cannot be
identical to a causal process of this kind, it is entirely compatible with process re-
liabilism that MPI is part of such a kind of process. In fact, it is overwhelmingly
plausible that in any version of our toy case in which you do arrive at a justified
belief in q based on MPI, this is exactly what happens. Once we are clear that
justified beliefs in the conclusions of modus ponens inferences involve punctiform
inferences, without being exhausted by them, the supposed problem for process
reliabilism disappears. Since VR-JB* is said to inherit this problem from process
reliabilism, if the latter walks free, so does the former.
5.2 The Cogito
Let’s move on to the second problem, then. Whilst involving a different case, the
thrust of the objection is similar to the first:
[Process reliabilism] would reject the cogito, since the important com-
petence exercised in Descartes’s belief is an infallible one that is in-
stantaneous in its operation, since relevant competences pertain to the
very moment of the belief <I think> or <I exist>. What happens prior
to that moment might have been missing with no effect on the qual-
ity of the process and its reliability. What matters is that at the very
moment when the believer believes a proposition with that content the
belief must be true. The connection requires the absolute temporal
coincidence. What happens prior to the believing is irrelevant to the
infallible reliability required for certainty.
Unsurprisingly, my response here is similar to the one offered above. First, con-
sider a version of the case in which Descartes believes <I think>, say, but not based
on reliable introspection (or perhaps rational intuition). Rather, his belief is pro-
duced by an evil demon who causes Descartes to switch back and forth between
believing <I think> and <I do not think>. Here, Descartes’s belief is not justified.
This means that simply hosting a belief in <I think> is not sufficient for Descartes
to justifiably believe <I think>. Rather, his belief in <I think> must be properly
based, e.g. on reliable introspection (rational intuition). However, this requires
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that his belief in <I think> is causally related to reliable introspection (rational
intuition) in the right way. What’s needed for Descartes to justifiably believe <I
think> is that his belief in <I think> is produced in the right way by the right kind
of causal process, e.g. one involving reliable introspection (rational intuition).
These considerations suggest that the critic is not quite right in claiming that
what happens prior to the moment of believing doesn’t matter to whether Descartes’s
belief in <I think> is justified. Rather, whether Descartes’s belief in <I think> is
justified depends crucially on whether it is produced by the right kind of causal
process and thus on what happens prior to the moment of believing.26 As a result,
the cogito also doesn’t produce an insurmountable problem for process reliabilism.
If so, the same goes for VR-JB*.27,28
5.3 Abilities and Competences
Finally, consider the following response on behalf of Sosa to the problem posed
by cases like the vow-case from section 2.3:
Sosa very rarely if ever appeals to ability or abilities. He focuses rather
on competence, and would argue that the agent who would too rarely
shoot with the right hand is not really competent to attain success (re-
liably enough). He does intuitively have the ability to do so, but lacks
the competence. It might be argued that the view is refuted because
if, in the archer case, the agent happens to use his right hand excep-
tionally, he would surely succeed aptly, even though he exercises only
an ability and not a competence. But this is not very plausible. Com-
pare the would-be bank robber who has the ability to open the safe
by entering the right combination (the bare ability, which he has sim-
ply by having the proper use of his fingers with the lock available to
his operation). If he happens to exercise that bare ability on a cer-
tain occasion, that is not apt success. What he needs is something
approaching a competence: i.e., the disposition to try in what is likely
enough to be the right way, so that nearly all the many, many possible
combinations are ruled out as ones he would not employ.
26 Compatibly with that, it may well be that the process that actually produces Descartes’s belief
in <I think> is infallible in the sense that Descartes’s belief in <I think> could not be produced by
this process and produce a false belief in <I think>.
27 See [Goldman 1979: section 1] for a similar line of argument.
28 Note that other cases that may be thought to involve instantaneously operating competences
and so cause trouble for PR can be treated in the same way. Consider, for instance, a case in
which Descartes forms a basic a priori belief in <two plus two is four> that is justified by rational
intuition where this is thought to involve an instantaneously operating competence. Note, next,
that Descartes might also believe <two plus two is four> thanks to the workings of a demon who
causes him to switch back and forth between believing <two plus two is four> and <two plus two
is not four> in which case his belief is not justified. But given that this is so, we can now adapt the
treatment of the cogito case sketched above to the case at hand simply by replacing all occurrences
of ‘<I think>’ by ‘<two plus two is four>’ and of ‘reliable introspection (rational intuition)’ by
‘rational intuition’. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue.
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I think it’s quite common for folk to use ‘competence’ and ‘ability’ inter-
changeably and that’s how I have been using ‘ability’ so far. Of course, this is
not to say that there aren’t important distinctions to be made here. Crucially, once
we start distinguishing more carefully between various such properties, it’s impor-
tant to keep in mind that what we need is a property fit to feature in the accounts
of competent and apt performance at issue in the framework for the normativity of
performances that champions of VR invoke.
Now, I agree that competent and apt performance cannot plausibly be unpacked
in terms of any property of ability so minimal that even the bank robber in the
critic’s case possesses it (following the critic I will henceforth use ‘bare ability’ to
refer to this property of ability). I am also completely on board with the critic’s
argument for this. When the bank robber exercises his bare ability, he will not
perform aptly, no matter whether or not he succeeds and what conditions he may
find himself in.
At the same time, I’d insist that the property of competence fares no better. To
see why, note first that Sosa takes competences to require a disposition to succeed
were one to try. As the critic expressly acknowledges, this means that, in the vow
case, once you have taken the vow never to shoot with your right again you no
longer have the relevant arching competence. But now consider the version of
the vow case the critic also gestures towards: at some point after having taken
your vow you suffer a one-off lapse. Perhaps you think to yourself: “Whatever,
it’s so nice to take a proper shot and once doesn’t count anyway!” and take a
shot with your right. Suppose that conditions are favourable and your shot hits
the target right in the centre. It is no less plausible that, in this case, your shot
is apt, than it is plausible that, in the critic’s bank robber case, the bank robber’s
attempt at opening the safe is not apt. Since your shot is apt but you don’t have
the arching competence, there is reason to believe that the property of competence
is too strong for the purpose of analysing competent and apt performance at issue
in our normative framework.29 In this way, there is reason to believe that Sosa’s
proposal to unpack competence and aptness in terms of competences meets with
the same fate as the proposal to do so in terms of bare abilities: neither proposal
will work. Of course, the two fail for very different reasons. While bare abilities
are too weak for our purposes, competences are too strong.
But wait! If you don’t have the competence, isn’t there something important
that you are missing? Consider the vow case once more. Once you don’t have
the competence, isn’t there a clear sense in which we cannot trust you with taking
shots any more? And doesn’t this show that what we should be interested in is a
competence rather than an ability?
I do not mean to say that competence and aptness are the only normative prop-
erty that are of interest when it comes to evaluating performances. There may well
be others, including some that require the possession of a competence. However,
the fact remains that apt and competent performance are two important normative
29 Or, to be more precise, it will be too strong if it is unpacked in the way Sosa suggests. Note
that in what follows I will take competence to be unpacked in just this way.
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such properties. Since not even apt performance—the logically stronger one the
two—requires possession of a competence, neither does competent performance.
Given that champions of VR have proposed to identify knowledge with apt belief
and justified belief with competent belief, this means that neither knowledge nor
justified belief requires possession of a competence. Whatever normative property
may be missing when we do not have a competence is at any rate of little relevance
to the intended application of the normative framework to epistemology.
But isn’t that too quick? Why think that knowledge and justified belief do not
require possession of a relevant competence rather than that the relevant norma-
tive properties to be identified with knowledge and justified belief are not apt and
competent belief after all?
By way of response, note that there is independent reason against identify-
ing knowledge and justified belief with any normative property that requires pos-
session of a competence. To see this consider the following case, which is an
epistemic analogue of the vow case. For the longest time you have acquired infor-
mation on a certain issue—Brexit, say—from a newspaper you know to be highly
reliable—The Space, say. Suppose also that The Space is the only reliable newspa-
per available to you. For some reason, however, you recently took a vow never to
read The Space again. Instead you have taken to acquire information from a news-
paper that you know to be unreliable—The Moon, say. Since you are no longer
disposed to form beliefs about Brexit that are likely enough true when forming
beliefs about Brexit at all, you no longer have the relevant epistemic competence.
Now suppose it so happens that you suffer a one-off lapse. Perhaps you think to
yourself: “Whatever, it’s so nice to read a reliable newspaper and once doesn’t
count anyway!” and pick up a copy of The Space. One of the articles states that
citizens from other EU countries make up only 5% of the UK population and you
form the corresponding belief. Since it is hard to deny that your belief qualifies
as knowledge here, there is independent reason to think that knowledge does not
require the possession of the relevant epistemic competence anyway. And since
knowledge entails justified belief, the same goes for justified belief. What comes
to light, then, is that normative properties requiring possession of a relevant compe-
tence, interesting as they may be, are at any rate not suited for our epistemological
purposes of analysing knowledge and justified belief.
Still our critic may not be satisfied. After all, if the only options at our disposal
for spelling out the accounts of competent and apt performance are in terms of
either bare abilities or competences, we might still opt for competences as the
lesser of two evils.30 Fortunately, however, there is reason to believe that these are
not our only options. In particular, as I will argue momentarily, there is a further
sense of ‘ability’ such that the property of ability it picks out promises to be better
suited for our normative purposes.
Let’s first try and home in on the sense of ‘ability’ I have in mind by looking
at a case in which it is in play. Suppose while deliberating on whom to ask to take
30 In fact, it might be thought that this is exactly the point the critic is trying to make.
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a shot, the following conversation ensues between X and Y (for simplicity, I will
assume that your name is You and mine is I):
X : Let’s ask I. He lives right downstairs. He might able to help us.
Y : No. I is blind since his eye infection last month. He doesn’t have the ability to
make the shot.
X : I guess you are right. I didn’t know that I had gone blind. Let’s ask You then.
He surely has the ability to make this shot. After all, he is the reigning world
champion in archery.
Y : You has the ability alright. In fact, he is one of the finest shots ever—with his
right. Sadly, he recently took a vow never to shoot with his right again. And
he’s a terrible shot with his left. So, it’s pointless to ask him.
Here X and Y deny me the ability to hit the target, whilst attributing it to you. Since
both denial and attribution are serious, natural and appropriate, whilst not being
based on any false belief about some underlying matter of fact, this constitutes
evidence that they are both true.31
But now note that if we grant that the bank robber has the bare ability to open
the safe simply in virtue of having proper use of his fingers and so may, by sheer
luck, punch in the right numbers and open the safe, then we must also grant that
I, the blind man, have the bare ability to hit the target. After all, I have proper
command of my arms and hands and so may, by sheer luck, fire a shot that hits
the target. Since we have evidence that the denial of ability to me is true in this
case, there is reason to think that ‘ability’ does not have the relevant bare ability
as its semantic value here. Moreover, we have already seen that once you have
taken the vow you no longer have the relevant arching competence. Since there
is evidence that the attribution of ability to you is true, there is reason to think
that ‘ability’ does not have the relevant competence as its semantic value either.
Since the sense of ‘ability’ in play here has neither the property of bare ability
nor the property of competence as its semantic value, there is reason to believe
31 Keith DeRose describes the methodology that supports this claim in the following passages:
Since the speaker is using the term seriously and properly, and this use isn’t based
on any false beliefs the speaker has about underlying matters of fact . . . this is a use
I think a theory about the meaning of [the term] should try to make come out true,
and it’s a strike against a theory if it fails to do so.
[DeRose 2009: 18]
[The] ‘methodology of the straightforward’, as we may call it, takes very seriously
the simple positive and negative claims speakers make utilizing the piece of language
being studied, and puts a very high priority on making those natural and appropriate
straightforward uses come out true, at least when that use is not based on some false
belief the speaker has about some underlying matter of fact.
[DeRose 2009: 153]
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that there is a further property of ability that’s picked out by ‘ability’ in this sense.
(To facilitate exposition, in what follows, I will use ‘robust ability’ to refer to this
further property.)
Crucially, robust abilities still hold out the hope of being fit for featuring in the
accounts of competent and apt belief we are interested in. On the one hand, unlike
bare abilities, robust abilities are not present in cases like the bank robber’s. As a
result, the bank robber’s attempt at opening the safe is bound to come out as falling
short of aptness, even if it is successful. So, robust abilities can steer clear of the
problem preventing bare abilities from being fit for featuring in the account of
competent and apt belief. On the other hand, unlike competences, robust abilities
may be possessed even by agents who are not disposed to succeed upon trying.
As a result, when you take a shot with your right, you will still be exercising your
arching ability, and are in the ballpark for performing aptly. So, robust abilities
can steer clear of the problem preventing competences from being fit for featuring
in the account of competent and apt belief also.32
It comes to light that robust abilities are different from both the options the
critic countenances, to wit, bare abilities and competences. Neither bare abilities
nor competences are fit to feature in the accounts of competent and apt perfor-
mance at issue in the framework for the normativity of performances that we are
interested in. Robust abilities, in contrast, steer clear of the problems on both sides
and so may very well be up to the task. And while we may have opted for unpack-
ing competent and apt performance in terms of competences if our only options
here had been bare abilities on the one hand and competences on the other, once
it is clear that there is a third and more promising option available to us, there re-
mains little reason for us to go down that route. As a result, the critic’s attempt at
helping Sosa to a comeback by proposing that competent and apt performance are
to be unpacked in terms of competences fails.33
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a new virtue reliabilist account of justified belief as
competent belief. This account takes on board a number of insights of extant
virtue reliabilist contributions to the literature, including the idea that competent
32 It is not hard to see that the account of SGP abilities from Section 3.2 is fit to serve as an
account of robust abilities for SGP performances. After all, SGP abilities behave relevantly like
robust abilities. For instance, I, the blind man, do not have the SGP ability to hit the target in
ARCH. After all, SGP abilities feature a reliability condition that I simply don’t meet. In contrast,
as we have seen, you, the expert archer, do have the relevant SGP ability and do so even after you
have taken the vow.
33 Note also that in order to do be fit for unpacking competent and apt performance, robust
abilities must be taken to feature fine-grained dispositions, i.e. ones that are relativised to ways of
performing. Were robust ability taken to feature a coarse-grained disposition of the kind favoured
by Sosa, we’d be back to the problematic result that, in the version of vow case considered above,
the performance is not apt. As a result, robust abilities would be too strong to be fit for unpacking
competent and apt performance. The case for going more fine-grained thus stands as well.
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performance requires exercise of ability and that abilities involve dispositions to
attain success. Crucially, the view also departs from the general accounts of abil-
ity offered by virtue reliabilists in that it takes abilities to be relative to ways of
performing. It is worth noting that the claim that abilities are relative to ways of
performing means that the resulting virtue reliabilist account of justified belief in-
corporates a key process reliabilist idea. In fact, on the proposed view a version
of a process reliabilist condition drops out of an independently plausible general
account of abilities. In this way, the proposed account rationalises the core idea of
process reliabilism.
At the same time, the question arises as to whether the proposed account
thereby also inherits the problems that process reliabilism encounters. I have ar-
gued that the answer to this question is no. The proposed virtue reliabilist account
of justified belief does have the resources to solve, or at least defuse, a number of
key problems that have riddled process reliabilism. Since the account allows that
epistemic abilities can be exercised in unfavourable conditions, it can accommo-
date the presence of justified belief in cases of radical deception. Since it coun-
tenances a grounding condition on epistemic abilities, it can successfully predict
the absence of justified belief in clairvoyant cases. The generality problem is de-
fused once it is recognised that the problem arises not only for epistemic abilities,
but for abilities in general and that this version of the problem is not particularly
worrisome.
Given that the proposed account virtue reliabilist account not only drops out
of an independently plausible general account of abilities, their exercise and com-
petent performance, but also avoids a number of the key problems that both pro-
cess reliabilism and rival virtue reliabilist theories encounter, I submit that it is a
promising view and deserves to be taken seriously.
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